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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTcY-DISTRIBUTION

OF PROCEEnS FROM SALE FREE OF LiEcS-

The defendant company was adjudged a bankrupt on a creditor's bill. The receivers sold its heavily mortgaged property, against the protest of the mortgagees, free of liens, for a sum less than the mortgage bonds. The trustee for
the mortgage bondholders filed a claim for the proceeds and the lower court
ordered distribution thus: a) Payment of franchise tax. b) Allowance to the
attorney of defendant's trustee in bankruptcy. c) A dividend to mortgagees.
d) Balance to receiver's attorney. Held, that after payment of franchise tax,
the entire proceeds should be turned over to the trustee for the bondholders.
Seaboard National Bank v. Rogers Milk Products Co., Inc., 21 F.(2d) 414,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1927).

A bankruptcy court may order the sale of the bankrupt's mortgaged property, free of liens, transferring the liens to the proceeds. But, as the lienees
are already sufficiently protected, this should never be done unless a sum is
likely to be realized, above the lien, for the benefit of general creditors.' An
error, however, cannot be placed upon the mortgagees,2 and if the sum realized
is insufficient, it all belongs to them. The expenses of selling the property,
except those to enforce the lien,' cannot be taken from the fund, unless the
lienees request the sale and it is for their benefit.4 Bankruptcy proceedings, as
in the instant case, provide no such benefit to them, and cannot be charged
against the proceeds.' This includes payments to the receiver,' to the trustee in
bankruptcy, or his attorney,' or to the petitioning creditor's counsel' for their
respective services. It is immaterial that this distribution deprives the bankruptcy officials of all compensation. It has been held that lienholders cannot
even be charged with the cost of preserving their property, as this is presumably
done for the benefit of general creditors ° This might be questioned if the true
Harralson's Petition, 179 Fed. 49o (C. C. A. 8th, 191o) ; (I923) 33 YALE

L. J. 2o2.
'it re Cutler & John,

228

Fed. 771 (D. C. N. C. 1916).

'Gugel v. New Orleans Nat. Bank, 239 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917). The
court said: "Imposing on the lienholder the burden of the cost of general administration of an insolvent estate, is a denial of the adequate remedy .
secured by the lien." See also It re Allert, 173 Fed. 691 (D. C. N. Y. i9o8).
'In re William's Estate, 156 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907).
' REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW (3d ed. 1923) § 261o. In re Utt, 105 Fed.
754 (C. C. A. 7th, igoi).
6In re William's Estate, supra note 4.
'.Jtna Life Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 186 Fed. 148 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911); Harralson's Petition, supra note I.
'In re Cutler & John, supra note 2; In re Gillaspie, I9O Fed. 88 (D. C. W.
Va. 1911)
'Smith v. Township of au Gras, 15o Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 6th, 1906).
" In re Vulcan Foundry & Machine Co., i8o Fed. 671 (C. C. A. 3d, Igio).
(But see dissenting opinion.)
(454)
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test is the benefit accruing to the lienholders. The principal case does not go so
far, however, and the principles stated seem fully to justify the reversal of the
lower court's decision.
BANKS AND BANKiNc--DFPosiTs-TITE To CECKS DEposn=a-The
plaintiff maintained a general deposit account with the bankrupts. The custom
of the bankrupts was to credit the plaintiff's account immediately when checks
were deposited, and to allow interest on such amounts from the date of deposit.
The plaintiff occasionally drew against such deposits before the checks had been
collected. At the plaintiff's direction, another bank delivered its check to the
bankrupts, payable to them "for account of" the plaintiff. The bankrupts immediately credited the plaintiff's account with the amount of the check, and made
an entry on their books indicating that the plaintiff was entitled to interest on
such amount from the date of deposit. Subsequent to this transaction, but before
the check had been collected, the petition in bankruptcy was filed. The plaintiff
now seeks to recover from the defendant, the trustee in bankruptcy, the full
amount of the check, on the theory that the bankrupts did not become the owners of the check at the time of deposit, but were merely the plaintiff's agents to
collect it. Held, that the plaintiff cannot recover. Equitable Truest Co. v.
Rocling, U. S. Sup. Ct., decided Nov. 21, 19271
When a check is deposited with a bank, whether the bank immediately
becomes the owner of it, or merely the agent of the depositor to collect it, is determined by the intention of the parties at the time the deposit is made? According to the great weight of authority, in the absence of an expressed intention,
where paper is indorsed without restriction by a depositor and is at once placed
to his credit by the bank, the inference to be drawn is that the bank has become
the purchaser of the paper, and in making the collection acts as owner and not
as the agent of the depositor,' notwithstanding a custom or agreement that the
bank may charge it back to the depositor's account if it is dishonored, this being
regarded as merely a means of the bank's reimbursing itself from the depositor
as indorser.' If the bank has become the owner, it follows that the depositor
is only entitled to come in on an equal footing with other creditors, in case of
insolvency.5 Where the deposit is made by one person in the name of another,

See also Latzko v. Equitable Trust Co., and Equitable Trust Co. v. Latzko,
both U. S. Sup. Ct., decided Nov. 21, 1927, involving the same point.
'St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566 (1889) ; Southwest Nat.
See Note, ii A. L.
Bank v. House, 172 Mo. App. 197, 157 S. W. 8o9 (913).
P- 1045 (1921).
'Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283 (19o5) ; Taft v. Bank, 172 Mass.

363, 52 N. E. 387 (18gg) ; German Nat. Bank v. Carnegie Trust Co., 172 App.
Div. 158, I58 N. Y. Supp. 222 (1gi6), aff'd without opinion, 224 N. Y. 552, 120
N. E. 863 (1918). Contra: Hazlett v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 132 Pa. I18,
I9 At. 55 (189o).
'Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, 271 U. S. 489 (1926) ; Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336, 83 Pac. io48 (19o5) ; Walker v. Ranlett Co., 89 Vt. 71, 93
Atl. 1054 (915).
'Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra note 3; Brusegaard v. Ueland,
72 Minn. 283, 75 N. W. 228 (1898) ; Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Loyd, 9o N. Y.
530 (1882).
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the same rules apply, the creditor being the person in whose name the deposit
was made.' On the other hand, where the intention, as shown by the indorsement or otherwise, is to deposit the check for collection, though the bank becomes the legal owner for the purpose of executing its agency, the equitable title
remains in the depositor, and he can reclaim it at any time before it is collected.
In the principal case, what the plaintiff intended to get, and the bankrupts to
give, was an available credit, not an agency for collection. The words "for
account of" being connected with the name of the payee, and not used in an
indorsement, were merely a direction as to whose account was to be credited.
As the court aptly remarks regarding these words, "They are not an incantation
which unfailingly invokes an agency."
CARRIERS-RIGHT OF A RAILROAD TO PREFERENCE IN THE GRANTING OF CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE-To fulfil the requirements of a statute,' cer-

tain bus companies applied to the State Road Commission for certificates of
convenience to operate their vehicles over a designated route. The railroad company which was already serving that route through its subsidiaries subsequently
applied for like certificates. The Commission granted the earlier applications.
On appeal to the circuit court, the decision of the Commission was reversed.
Held, (one judge dissenting) that the railroad company should be given a preference over prior applicants. Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co. v.
State Road Commission, 139 S. E. 744 (W. Va. 1927).
The regulation of motor vehicles engaged as common carriers is now generally accomplished by requiring a certificate of public convenience as a prerequisite to operation
The purpose of such regulation is twofold: (I) to protect the highways by restricting the number of motor vehicles which may use
them, and (2) to maintain adequate and sufficient carrier service to the travelling public, by regulation of the number and methods of motor carriers. The
problem in the principal case is whether in the absence of a legislative policy,'
the courts should give a preference to an already established utility which ex'Heath v. New Bedford Safe Deposit Co., 184 Mass. 481, 69 N. E. 215
(19o4) ; Egbert v. Payne, 99 Pa. 239 (1881).

"White v. National Bank, io U. S. 658 (188o) (indorsed to indorsee for
account of indorser) ; Evansville Bank v. German-American Bank, 155 U. S.
556 (I895) (indorsed for collection) ; Hackett v. Reynolds, 114 Pa. 328, 6 AtI.
689 (I886) (sent for collection, though not so indorsed).
1

W. Va. AcTs 1925, c. 17, § 82.
(3d ed. 1925)

2 POUND, PUBLIc UTILITIES

§§ 955,

ioo2, lists the various

states having such requirements. That such regulation is within the power of
the state cannot be questioned. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service
v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876); Budd v.
Corps., 248 U. S. 372 (1918); i Munn
New York, 143 U. S. 517 (I89 ) ; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S.
389 (1913). But as to motor carriers operating in interstate commerce such
regulation is invalid. Michigan Public Utility Co. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570
0925); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (925); (927) 75 U, OF PA. L.
REv. 565.
'As for example in Illinois, see Egyptian Transportation System v. Railroad Co., 321 Ill. 58o, 152 N. E. 510 (1926) ; Bartonville Bus Line v. Eagle
Motor Coach Line, 326 Ill. 200, 157 N. E. 175 (927).
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presses a willingness to increase its facilities to include a new type of service.
The argument against such a preference in law lies in the inference from the
early established principle,' that the grants of privileges from a state must be
strictly construed. But the theory of the court was that the Commission's only
duty was to see that service was "necessary and convenient for the public"; that
the modern theory of economics was opposed to the notion that competition in a
public utility was necessary for the most adequate service; ' and that the railroads, having large investments, perform certain vital functions which the bus
companies cannot perform. It was further advanced that railroads must be
preserved and should be permitted to receive a fair return on their investment,
and failure to permit a railroad to earn the emoluments from bus service would
seriously impair its efficiency and increase the rates for service. The economics
of the court seems incontestable. It is a question, however, whether it is not a
usurpation of power for a court to impress its theory of economics on a commission whose function is discretionary and legislative, except where its decision
affects property rights of the existing carrier.'
COPYRIGHT-INFRINGEMENT By BROADcAsTiNc-An English court has recently decided that the broadcasting of a copyrighted opera, without the permission of the owner of the copyright, is an infringement under the English Copyright Act, (igii) I &-2 Geo. V. c. 46 § 35 (I). Messager v. British Broadcasting
Co., Ltd., [1927] 2 K. B. 543. This is the first English decision on this comparatively new point, and is in accord with similar decisions in the United States
and Australia. See Note (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 549.
EMINENT DOMAIN-CONTRACT OF A CITY

NOT

To CONDEMN-In

proceed-

ings to condemn a strip of defendant's land for a public street, it was interposed
as a defense that in 19o8, the city had made a contract with the defendant,
whereby the defendant conveyed a strip of land to it, and in consideration of
this conveyance the city had promised to open up and maintain a street on that
" Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, ii Pet. 4.o (U. S. 1831). This
case, the leading case on the construction of franchises, reflects the state's attitude of laissez-faire toward competition in public utilities at the time.
ISee on this point, Hardman, The Changing Law of Competition in Public
Service, (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 219.
"This is the policy of the Pennsylvania Commission. See Rosenbaum and
Lilienthal, The Regulation of Motor Carriers in Pennsylvania, (1927) 75.U.
OF PA. L. REv. 696, at 711, note 6o. In accord see the following commission
decisions: Washington Railway v. Washington Rapid Transit Co. P. U. R.
I922C 754 (Dist. of Col.); Re Blue and Gray Bus Line, P. U. R. I24A 449
(Utah) and note; Re Maine Motor Coaches, Inc., P. U. R. 1926B 545 (Me.),
citing other cases in accord.
' The court had passed on this preliminary problem as to the right to review
in Reynolds Taxi Co. v. Hudson, 136 S. E. 833 (W. Va. 1927). But see Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, supra note 6, at 722: ". _. . the court in reviewing the
findings of the Commission, as to public convenience in the issuance of a certificate, will merely look to see if the judgment rests upon competent and relevant
evidence. It will not look to the expediency or wisdom of the order nor will it
weigh the evidence to determine if, on the testimony, it would make a similar
ruling."
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land and not to condemn any more of the defendant's land. Held, that the
promise by the city not to condemn was void, and that the defendant could not
compel the return of the land conveyed in 19o8, nor receive compensation therefor. City of Moberly v. Hogan, 298 S. W. 236 (Mo. 1927).
It is established that the sovereign powers of the state cannot be bargained
away, restrained or extinguished, either by contract or action of the legislature.'
It is equally well settled that this rule applies to the power of eminent domain,'
and an agreement by a city that its power of eminent domain shall not be exercised in a particular manner or in respect to a certain property, is null and void,
as being contrary to public policy.' Therefore, that part of the court's decision
which held that the previous agreement of the city was not a defense to this
action, is undoubtedly correct. But the court in deciding that the city was entitled to keep the land conveyed to it in i9oS, without paying any compensation
therefor, really permitted the city to do indirectly what it could not do by direct
action, namely, appropriate property without payment of compensation. The
court thought that the opening up and maintenance of the street by the city was
sufficient consideration for the conveyance, and that the additional promise not
to condemn was merely a nullity. But this promise, being contrary to public
policy, is illegal consideration, and if part of the consideration of a contract
is illegal, the entire contract is void, unless the contract is divisible." However,
the decision of the instant case can be supported on the ground that the land
was conveyed by the defendant under a mistake of law, and hence he was not
entitled to relief.'
EQUITY-MARSHALLING OF ASSETS WHmE THERE ARE Two DEBToRsA, B, C, and D, co-legatees each for the sum of $4ooo, assigned their respective
interests to W, as collateral security for a $ioooo note, owed by A. Subsequently, X attached A's interest, and other creditors claimed against B and C.
On adjudication, the lower court awarded A's entire share to X, D's entire interest to W; while B and C's shares completed the remainder of W's $1o,00o,
the residue to their other creditors. On appeal, Held, that A's entire interest
belongs 'to W, and that D, after paying an equal share with B and C to
W, receive the remainder back. Schwarz's Estate, 290 Pa. 420 (1927).
The lower court distributed upon the equitable doctrine of marshalling
assets: that where a paramount creditor (W) has a lien upon two funds in
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 189o) 148, 337, 338.
'Pennsylvania Hospital v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U. S. 20 (1917);
Hyde Park v. Cemetery Association, 119 Ill. 141, 7 N. E. 627 (1886) ; People
v. Adirondack R. R., 16o N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689 (1899).
'Matter of Opening First Street, 66 Mich. 42, 33 N. W. 15 (1887) ; LEwIs,
EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 19o9) § 406; 4 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORORA-

'COOLEY,

TIONS (1912)
4

§ 1457.

Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. Mason, 44 Minn. 318, 46 N. W.

558 (189o) ; Lennig's Estate, 182 Pa. 485, 38 Atl. 466 (1897).

'Denchy v. McNulta, 86 Fed. 825 (C. C. A. 7th, 1898); Cole v. BrownHurley Hardware Co., 139 Iowa 487, 117 N. W. 746 (i9o8).

A. S. R. 497 (19o6).
'3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)

§ 1582.

See Note, 117
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the hands of a common debtor (A), and another creditor (X) has a lien on only
one of the funds, the former will be compelled to go against the fund to which
the other cannot resort 1 And if the paramount creditor resorts to the doubly
charged fund, equity will subrogate the junior creditor to his rights in the
other fund But in the principal case, the doctrine has no application. There
is no common debtor with two charged funds, but rather, several debtors, each
with his own fund. Considering B, C, and D as sureties of A, the result reached
is even more justified. Where the paramount creditor has a lien on two funds,
one in the hands of the principal debtor, and the other in the surety, and the
junior creditor has a right only against the debtor's fund, equity will not compel the former creditor to go first against the surety.' As a corollary, if he
seeks the debtor first, the junior creditor has no right of subrogation against
the surety.' Marshalling is never applied inequitably as to any of the parties.
Where, as here, there are two debtois, marshalling is permitted only in the rare
case where it is equitable that one debtor exonerate the other.' But this is the
privilege of the debtor secondarily liable and gives a junior creditor no right to
make a similar request of the equity court.7
ESTATEs-DSE FOLLOWED BY A CiAusE AGAiNST ALIENATION AND A

GIFT To CIDRmE-The testatrix devised real estate to the plaintiff, "he . . .
not to sell such . . . and after his death, the same to become the property
of his children absolutely." The plaintiff, after taking possession, contracted to
convey the fee to the defendant, who refused to perform on the ground the
plaintiff could not convey a fee. The lower court, in a case stated, gave judgment for the defendant. Held, that the judgment be affirmed, as the plaintiff
had only a life estate. Reiff v. Pepo, 290 Pa. 5o8 (1927).
In its technical sense, it is clear that the word "children" is a word of
purchase and not of limitation, and speaking generally, it will not be accepted

'Neff v. Miller, 8 Pa. 347 (1848); Newby v. Fox, 9o Kan. 317,

133 Pac.
258. *
Pa. 512 (i86i) ; S-M., loc. cit. supra

890 (I913); SNELL, PRINCIPIES OF EQUITY (18th ed.

'Delaware v. Hudson Canal Co., 38

1920)

note i.

Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59, 56 Atl. 323 (19o3) ; Gaines v. Hill, 147
Ky. 445, 144 S. W. 92 (i912) ; Boone v. Clark, 129 Ill. 466, 21 N. E. 85o (i889);
In re Hobson, 81 Iowa 392, 46 N. W. io95 (189o).
' Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. i5o (1876). If the doubly charged fund is
in the surety, however, and the paramount creditor moves against it, the junior
creditor may be subrogated to the former's rights against the debtor. Neff v.
Miller, supra note I; Huston's Appeal, 69 Pa. 485 (1875); Gaines v. Hill,
supra note 3; Gearheart v. Jordan, i Pa. 325 (1849).
'Reynolds v. Tooker, 18 Wend. 591 (N. Y. 1836); Lloyd v. Galbraith, 32
Pa. 103 (1858) ; Carter v. Tanner's Leather Co., i96 Mass. 162, 8 N. E. 902
(Io7).
' Gearheart v. Jordan, supra note 5; Ayres v. Husted, 15 Conn. 504 (1843);
Huston's Appeal, supra note 4.
T
Blanchard v. Naquin, ii6 La. 8o6, 41 So. 99 (i9o6). In the following
cases where there were two debtors, the necessary equities did not exist in their
relationship to give one debtor the right to have one of his creditors move
against the other debtor. Bradley v. Bond, ioi Md. 691, 6i Atl. 504 (905);
Carter v. Tanner's Leather Co., supra note 5.
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as a word of limitation unless from the context of the will as a whole, it appears that the word was used in the sense of issue or as representing the whole
line of direct succession.' But this rule must give way if the testator's intention clearly appears to be otherwise, and indicates that by "children" he intended
not the immediate offspring, but an indefinite line of takers, as "her children,
or other lineal descendants," ' or "his children forever." ' In the instant case,
the court decided that the intent was clear that the plaintiff was to take only a
life-estate, and since this was not followed by words of limitation, the rule in
Shelley's Case did not apply. In so holding, two other Pennsylvania cases were
distinguished. In Williams v. Leech' there was a devise to A and B, and in a
subsequent clause it was provided that the land was not to be sold, but "after
their or either of their deaths, their portions shall be equally divided among their
children and their heirs, and if either die without issue, their portion shall be
equally divided among the survivors." The latter clauses were held not inconsistent with a fee, being limitations first to the lineal heirs of the devisees, then
to their collateral heirs, that is, to the heirs in general. Therefore, a fee passed
under the rule in Shelley's Case. In the principal case no words of limitation
are used. Furthermore, in using the word "absolutely" to qualify the estate of
the children and in failing to use that word in reference to the estate of the
plaintiff, the testatrix indicates a different intent. In Cross v. Miller' there was
a devise in fee to certain nieces, followed in a later clause by words stating
who were to be the heirs of the devisees. The latter clause was held an ineffective attempt to cut down a fee. Therefore, in the instant case, if the clause
against alienation were all that stood between the plaintiff and a fee, it could
not be held valid.' But the words following make the distinction, and when
taken as a whole, it can be reasonably said that the first taker was not meant
to have a fee.

EVIDENCE-CoNFLICT

BETWEEN

THE EXPERT WITNESSES OF THE PARTY

PROoF-To prove that an infection was a result of an
injury to his heel caused by the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff put the two
doctors, who had treated him, on the stand as experts. One of them testified
that the infection was caused by the injury. The other testified that the infection more probably was caused by a blister from an ill-fitting shoe. The deHAVING

THE

BURDEN

OF

'Smith v. Smith, 13o Ga. 532, 61 S. E. 114 (i9o8) ; Chapin v. Crow, i47
Ill. 219, 35 N. E. 536 (1893) ; Oyster v. Knell, i37 Pa. 448, 2o Atl. 624 (189o).

Cases where there is a present devise to one and his children, when he has not
children at the time of the devise, form an exception under the rule in Wild's
-Case. The instant case is a devise of a future interest to the children, and the
exception does not apply. See Manning v. Bader, 224 Pa. 575, 576, 73 Atl.
939, 94o (19o9).

Moreover, the rule in Wild's Case is not law in Pennsylvania.

Chambers v. Union Trust Co., 235 Pa. 61o, 84 Atl. 512 (1912).
'Mason v. Ammon, 117 Pa. 127, II AtI. 449 (1887).
'Hood v. Dawson, 98 Ky. 285, 33 S. W. 75 (895).
'28 Pa. 89 (i856).
'290 Pa. 213 (1927).
'Pattin v. Scott, 270 Pa. 49, 112 Atl. 911

(1921).
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fendant moved that in this state of proof the plaintiff was not entitled to go to
the jury on the question as to whether the infection was a consequence of the
negligent act. The defendant assigned the denial of this motion as error in an
appeal from an adverse judgment. Held, that the testimony should not have
been submitted to the jury. Mudano v. Philadelphia Rapid Traisit Co., 289
Pa. 5I, 137 Atl. 105 (927).
Where the plaintiff has the burden of proof, and is himself his only witness, the general rule, followed in Pennsylvania,' is that he has failed to sustain
that burden if his testimony is so conflicting that any finding on it could be
nothing more than a guess as to which of two inconsistent statements is true.'
But where the plaintiff relies on more than one witness, it is generally held that
it is for the jury to determine where the balance of probability lies, in the case
of conflict.! Since the plaintiff, in the principal case, relied on two experts, the
case would ordinarily have fallen within the scope of the second of the above
-rules. But the court brought the case within the first rule by deciding that the
plaintiff spoke through the mouths of the two doctors, whose testimony was
thus treated as that of the plaintiff personally. The reason for these two differing rules is that, where the plaintiff himself presents his whole case, he controls
what he says and so should be required to give a consistent account of what
occurred; but where he presented it through ordinary witnesses he cannot control what they may say,' and the relative value of their testimony should be
for the jury. This reason also appears applicable to experts whose testimony is based on their own observations of facts and it therefore seems
that considering the testimony of the two doctors as the party's personal testimony is questionable. To support its conclusion, the court further decided that
the expert testimony offered by one party as to scientific inferences should not be
submitted to the jury unless the whole is consistent and unequivocal in its important parts, for the jury would be confused rather than aided by such testimony. Nevertheless the court specifically recognizes that where there is a
conflict between the expert testimony of one party and the expert testimony
of the other, the jury must decide which of the witnesses to believe.5 Since it
may be questioned why the jury will be more confused by a conflict within the
ranks of one party's experts than by one between the experts of both parties,
it seems that conflict in the testimony of the experts of the plaintiff, who bears
the burden of proof, should not alone keep it from the jury.
1

Zenzil v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R., 257 Pa. 473, ioi AtI.
8og (1917) ; Mulligan v. Lehigh Traction Co., 241 Pa. 139, 88 AtI. 318 (1913).
'Ellis v. Great Western Ry., L. R. 9 C. P. 551 (1874); Western & Atlantic
R. R. v. Evans, 96 Ga. 481, 23 S. E. 494 (1895).
'Davis v. Cochran, 275 S. W. 426 (Tex. 1925) (scientific experts) ; The
Conqueror, 166 U. S. iio (1896) (quasi-experts, witnesses to testify as to
values). See Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Evans, supra note 2, at 486, 23 S. E.,
at 495; Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 179, 194 (Mass. 1826) (ordinary witnesses as
observers of facts).
'Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Evans, supra note 2.
'Benedict v. U. S., 270 Fed. 267 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1920); Hurley v.
Brewing Co., 13 App. Div. 167, 43 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1897) ; Jones v. Roberts,
96 Wis. 427, 7o N. W. 685 (1897).
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JUDGMENTS-REs

JUDICATA-VIRTuAL REPRESENTATION

CONTINGENT REMAINDERMAN

IN

OF A1=ra-BoRN

ACTION To DESTROY THE REmAINDER-The

grantor conveyed land by deed to his wife for life, remainder to his daughter for
life, remainder to her children. The daughter brought an action to quiet title
against her mother and her only child, who defended through a guardian ad
litem. The court decreed that the daughter held in fee simple. The plaintiff,
an after-bor child of the daughter by a subsequent marriage, brought this
action against the grantees of the daughter to remove a cloud on the title. Held,
(one judge dissenting) that the plaintiff is concluded by the previous judgment,
since her interests were represented by her half-brother. Bearss v. Corbett,
158 N. E. 299 (Ind. 1927).
A judgment ordinarily binds only parties and privies to the proceeding in
which it was rendered1 However, there is an exception to this rule, known as
the doctrine of "virtual representation," 2 by which a person whose interests
were efficiently presented to the court by a party having similar interests,' in a
proceeding decided on the merits, will be bound by the judgment, even though
he was not in esse when it was rendered.' The doctrine is founded on the necessity for settling the rights of members of the present generation, even at the risk
of some injustice to members of future generations,' and on the great convenience of quickly disposing of litigation. It is presumed that the party
representing the class will fully protect the interests of all members, since these
accord with his own interests.? As the doctrine is based on necessity, and is
sometimes very harsh, it should only be applied where that necessity exists.'
Thus where the effect of the judgment on the contingent interest is merely to
change it into personal property,' or to destroy it when it is adverse to the
paramount title,' there is no injustice in binding by representation the contin1I

FREEMAN,

22 VAN

JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 305.
.FORMER ADJUDcATioN (1895) §§ 491-499.

FLEEr,

'As to who may be represented by a party see I Freeman, op. cit. supra
note I, § 490. See Note (915)
15 COL. L. REv. 346. As to representation of an
after-born child seeking to recover under Lord Campbell's Act see Nelson v.
Galveston, etc., R. R., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S. W. 1021 (890).
See (0924)
34 YALE L. J. 331.
'Miller v. Texas, etc. R. R., 132 U. S. 662 (i89o).
See McArthur v.
Scott, 113 U. S. 340 (1884). For collection of authorities see Note, 8 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 49 (907).
Contra: In re De Leon's Estate, to2 Cal. 537, 36 Pac. 864
(894).
'Pugh v. Prierson, 221 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915).
'Los Angeles County v. Winans, 13 Cal. App. 234, io9 Pac. 64o (igio);
Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N. E. 62 (1921).
'Bearss v. Corbett, cited in text.
'Los Angeles County v. Winans, supra note 6; Bearss v. Corbett, superseded
opinion, 152 N. E. 866 (Ind. 1926).
' Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49 N. E. 523 (x898) (preserving life estate
from taxes) ; Kenyon v. Davis, 219 Pa. 585, 69 Atl. 62 (I9o8) (partition).
Contra: Hotaling v. Marsh, 132 N. Y. 29, 3o N. E. 249 (1892) (where the
construction of a will in a partition proceeding did not bind those in posse).
"Gray v. Smith, 76 Fed. 525 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1896), aff'd 83 Fed. 824
(C. C. A. 9th, 1897); Kent v. Church of St. Michael, 136 N. Y. 10, 32 N. E.
704 (1892) ; VAN FLEET, op. cit. supra note 2, § 495. The necessity is not so
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gent remainderman in posse. And the necessity is equally clear where the
judgment is in ren, or where a strong public policy controls. = However, in
a case like Bearss v. Corbett, where the doctrine is applied to cut off the rights
of the contingent remainderman, rather than to change them into another form,
and to enlarge the estate of the life tenant into a fee simple, it would seem that
the reason of the rule has been overlooked.' There is no apparent necessity to
apply the doctrine," nor can the guardian ad litem"be assumed properly to represent the interests of persons not it; esse.' Where the unborn contingent remaindermen are represented by the vested remaindermen merely to destroy their
V
contingent remainders, there is a serious danger of fraud.
' If, however, the
view of the majority be adopted, the same result may be reached more directly
by holding, as is held in other situations, that the contingent remaindermen are
in privity with the vested remaindermen claiming under the same deed.

LANDLORD AND

TEiNTANT-CovENANT

NOT To ASSIGN IN

A

LEASE TO A

lease was executed to C and LD, partners, including a covenant not to assign "this lease, or any part thereof," and a condition for forfeiture upon breach. C, on withdrawing from the firm, assigned to D his interest
in the lease. In an action by the lessor for restitution, Held, that the assignment of the interest of one partner to another does not violate the covenant.
PA T Easni--A

Safeway Stores v. Buhlinger, 259 Pac. 1013 (Cal. 1927).

It is usually held that a general covenant against assignment in a lease to
a partnership necessarily involves the separate interest of each partner as a
tenant in common; hence the covenant is breached when one transfers his own
interest either to a stranger or to his co-lessees. On the other hand, when the
lessee conveys only part of his interest, remaining himself a tenant, as where
clear in the case of a mortgage, but the rule is applied. Doremus v. Dunham,
55 N. J. Eq. 511, 37 Atl. 62 (1897).
For Pennsylvania doctrine in judicial sales see Revised Price Act, June
7, 1917, P. L. 338 § 8, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 18820; Swift v. HarbisonWalker Co., 228 Pa. 584, 77 Atl. 916 (igio). See Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn.
29, 64 N. W. 99 (1895) (decree construing will).
"Los Angeles County v. Winans, supra note 6 (eminent domain); Stewart v. O'Neal, 237 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; Tonnele v. Wetmore, i95
N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. io68 (19o9) (both decrees construing wills).
'Bearss v. Corbett, superseded opinion supra note 8.
"Elmore v. Galligher, 205 Ala. 23o, 87 So. 349 (i92i) ; Johnson v. Jacob,

74 Ky. 646 (1876).

Contra: Hopkins v. Patton, 257 Ill. 346, iOO N. E. 992

(1913).
But see Downey v. Seib, 185 N. Y. 427, 78 N. E. 66 (19o6).
'Mortimer v. Bashore, 317 Ill. 535, 148 N. E. 317 (1925) (where persons

in posse were not permitted to be sued directly through a guardian ad litem).
See Los Angeles County v. Winans, supra note 6.
I FREEMAN, 6p. cit. supra note

1, § 489.

1

Varley v. Coppard, L. R. 7 C. P. 505 (1872) ; Loveless v. Fitzgerald, 42
Can. S. C. 254 (igo9) ; Tober v. Collins, 130 Ill. App. 333 (i9o6). See also
Saxeney v. Panis, 239 Mass. 207, 131 N. E. 331 (1921); Emery v. Hill, 67
N. H. 330, 333, 39 At. 266, 267.
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a new partner is admitted, it is generally held that the covenant is not breached.2
The problem is one of construction. Courts which hold that a conveyance of
the entire interest of a co-lessee does not breach the covenant proceed on the
ground that, the parties having failed to make clear their intention, restrictions
upon alienation must be construed strictly against the lessor.3 This is the basis
of the instant case, supported by a line of California decisions, which clearly
hold that a transfer by one partner of his separate interest, even to a third
party, is not a breach of the covenant. The Pennsylvania court has indicated,
though only by way of dicta, that it also inclines toward a strict construction
of the covenant in this respect.! But the doctrine of strict construction is
properly applied only when the parties have not clearly expressed their intention.5 It seems that the California courts disregard this fundamental principle,
and will not protect the lessor unless there is an express stipulation against this
particular method of alienation." Such an added precaution should not be
essential. The intention of the parties may be otherwise clearly indicated.'
However, in most states, in order fully to protect the lessor, the cautious draftsman should insert such a covenant.
MORTGAGES-EFFECT OF RECORDER'S MISTAKE IN

MARKING MORTGAGE SAT-

IsFIEia-The plaintiff accepted a mortgage on the defendant's property, and
recorded it immediately after execution. Subsequently, plaintiff ordered the
recorder to release a mortgage on another property. Instead of following the
plaintiff's instructions, the recorder entered the release on the mortgage involved in this suit. The plaintiff was not aware of this mistake. One of the
defendants, the junior mortgagee, believed the property to be unencumbered
and accepted another mortgage on it. He knew that plaintiff's mortgage had
Miller v. Pond, 214 Mich. i86, 183 N. W. 24 (I92I) ; Hargrave v. King,
4o N. C. 430 (1848). Cf. Boyd v. Fraternity Hall, i6 Ill. App. 574 (1885)
(where it was ield that admitting a new partner to possession did not breach a
covenant against subletting).
Restrictions upon alienation of interest are not favored and are construed
strictly, especially when there is a condition for forfeiture upon such alienation.
Gazlay v. Williams, 147 Fed. 678 (C. C. A. 6th, i9o6); I TIFFANY, LANDLORD
AND TENANT (I910)
§ 152(b) et seq.
'Randol v. Scott, iio Cal. 59o, 42 Pac. 976 (895) ; Spangler v. Spangler,
ii Cal. App. 321, io4 Pac. 995 (igog) ; Adelstein v. Greenberg, 77 Cal. App.
548, 247 Pac. 520 (1926). The theory is that, the covenant being joint, it prohibits only joint assignments. But when all the co-lessees assigned their interests separately to a new tenant, the court held that the covenant was breached.
De Angeles v. Cotta, 62 Cal. App. 691, 217 Pac. 821 (1923). Cf. Roosevelt v.
Hopkins, 33 N. Y. 81 (1865).
'Swartz v. Bixler, 261 Pa. 282, IO4 AtI. 59I (1918) ; Hunter v. Johns, 275
Pa. 532, ii9 Atl. 6o5 (923).
' See TIFFANY, loc. Cit. supra note 3.
3
Note the clear wording of the covenant in Adelstein v. Greenberg, supra
note 4, at 551, 247 Pac. at 521.
'Varley v. Coppard, Tober v. Collins, both supra note I, arguing that since

the parties have clearly enough indicated their intention, there is no need to
apply rules of construction. Cf. Hoffman v. 2Etna, etc., Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 405
(1865).
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been marked satisfied, but was unaware that this was due to the mistake of the
recorder. This is an action to foreclose brought by the senior mortgagee.
Held, that the senior mortgagee should prevail. Commercial B. & L. Co. v.
Foley, 158 N. E. 236 (Ohio 1927).
Under similar facts, other courts have arrived at the same decision by
various lines of reasoning. It has been held that the purchaser or subsequent
mortgagee has a duty to ascertain whether the mortgage was satisfied in fact, in
order to claim as a bona fide purchaser. Another theory is that the recorder
was never authorized to satisfy the mortgage in suit and satisfaction without
authority is a nullity? Other courts simply say that the alteration of a true
record by a negligent third party is void? The court in the principal case
bases its decision on "the rule that the equity first in order of time is entitled
to priority." This equitable maxim is more accurately stated, "as between
persons having only equitable interests, if their equities are in all other respects
equal, priority of time gives the better equity." ' It is obvious. that application
of this rule is impossible where one party to the controversy has full legal
title. Therefore, in those states recognizing the title theory of mortgages, this
rule can have no force. Further, the maxim provides little help in the usual
case, the question being whether the equities, other than of time, are equal." It
would seem that this tendency to depart from the well recognized theories
should be characterized as distinctly retrogressive.
OrricEs-Da. FAcTo JUSTICES oF PE-AcE-A lawful justice of the peace
resigned before the expiration of his term. The defendant was appointed by
trustees of the township and commissioned by the governor to fill the unexpired
term. He continued to perform the functions of the office after the next general election, as no one was then elected to succeed him. Relator, sentenced by
defendant after said general election date, challenged his authority. Held, that
defendant was at least a de facto officer and as such his sentence was binding.
Ex parte Conley, i58 N. E. 552 (Ohio 1927).
A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office, and performing
its functions under color of authority or title.' This color of right may be
supplied by a definite election or appointment, no matter how irregular or
informal? It is also acquired, as in the instant case, by one continuing to dis-

'Berryman v. Becker, 173 Mo. App. 346, 158 S. W. 899 (1913); Swarthout v. Curtis, 5 N. Y. 301 (185i).
'Bruce v. Bonney, 78 Mass. 107 (1857); Harris v. Cook, 28 N. J. Eq.
345 (1877); Brown v. Henry, io6 Pa. 262 (1884).
'Heyder v. Excelsior B. L. Assn., 42 N. J. Eq. 403 (1886).
'Rice v. Rice, 2 Drew 73, 76 (Eng. 1853).
'See Waltham Co-operative Bank v. Barry, 231 Mass. 270, 121 N. E. 71
(i9i8), where the "negligence rule" was applied.
'Waterman v. Chicago, etc., R. IL, 139 Ill. 658, 29 N. E. 689 (I892);
Creighton v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 142 (i885) ; State v. Oates, 86 Wis. 634, 57
N. W. 296 (1893).
'Comostock v. Hempstead, 83 Conn. 554, 78 Atl. 442 (igio); Daugherty
v. Fippinger, i77 Ill. App. 522 (1913); Commonwealth v. Wotton, 201 Mass.
8i, 87 N. E. 202 (igog).
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charge duties after the expiration of his rightful term of office.' It has long
been settled that the judgments of such officers are as binding upon the public
as those of de jffre officials.4 The reason for this ruling is founded on principles of sound public policy, recognized at early common law' and equally applicable today6 A majority of courts advance the rule that the existence of a
de jure office is a condition precedent to the existence of a de facto officer.'
This view proceeds on the theory that there can be no title, hence no color of
title, to a non-existent office. Followed in the United States to its logical conclusion in one type of cases (where an office is created by an unconstitutional
act), it produces those exact difficulties the de facto doctrine is intended to
remedy.8 Some courts have recognized this underlying discrepancy and have
suggested the general rule above stated does not apply to offices which, due to
improper methods of creation, have a potential existence only.' This limita°
tion, although reaching the desired result, appears wholly arbitrary." Other
existence
of
the
necessity
denied
the
directly
have
logically,
jurisdictions, more
of a de jure office' and point out an analogy with the universally followed rule
of law exempting the acts of officers of de facto municipal corporations from
collateral attack by private parties." The instant decision represents a proper
application of the old de facto rule and achieves a result the reason behind that
rule intends.
TAXATION-ESTATE TAx-ExEmmION WHEN TAxED WITHIN FIvE
YEARS PRIOR To DEcmENT's DEATH-A died and his estate paid the federal
estate tax. A left securities to B, some of which were converted into cash by
sale, by maturity, and by payment of liquidation dividends. B deposited the
proceeds in her general bank account, together with other moneys. Checking
from this account, B purchased other securities, but at no time did the amounts
of the new securities exceed the deposits of the proceeds of the old securities.
'Trustees

of Schools Township v. Cowden,

240

Ill. 44, 88 N. E. 285

(I913); Simpson v. Patton, I Ohio App. 157 (i913); Ekern v. McGovern, i54
Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595 (1913).

'Donough v. Deavey, 82 Mich. 309, 46 N. W. 782 (189o); Parker v.
Barker, 8 Paige 428 (N. Y. I84O); Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436
(1867).
'Rex v. Bedford Level, 6 East. 359 (I8O5) ; Parker v. Kett, i Ld. Raym.
658 (790).

'Lang v. Mayor of Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 Atl. 9o (907).
'Norton v. Shelby County, ii8 U. S. 425 (1886) ; State v. Malcom, 39
Idaho i85, 226 Pac. IO83 (924) ; It re Norton, 68 Kan. 842, 68 Pac. 639 (I902).
'Lang v. Mayor of Bayonne, supra note 6.
'Speer v. Kearney County, 88 Fed. 749 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898); Buck v.
Eureka, 109 Cal. 504, 42 Pac. 243 (895) ; Smith v. Lynch, 29 Ohio 261 (1876).
10See Note, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94 (907).
"State v. Carrol, 38 Conn. 449 (1871); State v. Bailey, io6 Minn. 138,

18 N. W. 676 (i9o8); Lang v. Mayor of Bayonne, supra note 6.
"Speer v. Kearney Co., supra note 9; State v. Town of Dover, 62 N. J.
L. 138, 41 Atl. 98 (1898) ; Blackburn v. Oklahoma City, I Okla. 292, 31 Pac.
782 (1893).
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B died within five years of A, holding the new securities until her death. The
Board of Tax Appeals held' that the new securities were tax exempt, under a
provision of the Revenue Act of pzxgS. The United States brought an action
for the deficiency. Held, that the newly-acquired securities are taxable. United
States v. Rodenbough, 21 F.(2d) 781 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1927).
The determination of this case turned on the construction of the clause
"which can be identified as having been acquired in exchange for."' The Government contended that the statute contemplated a single transaction, a common
law exchange or barter. The Board of Tax Appeals went on the broad ground
that the statute required a deduction to the value of property which could be
identified or traced back to the original property. The court asserted the rule
that in taxation questions regard is had to matters of substance, rather than of
form,' but reasoned that where the securities had matured, and where the liquidation dividends had been paid, there could be no substantial exchanges, as
there was no longer any property to exchange. Where the securities were
sold and the proceeds were deposited in the general account, the court refused
to adopt an analogy to the tracing of trust funds, and decided that these securities could not be said to have been acquired in exchange for the old. In Cary
v. United States,' decided two days after the Rodenbough case, a very similar
problem arose. There the decedent invested money, received in lieu of a bequest," in securities. She sold some, investing the proceeds in new securities.
In holding these securities exempt from tax, the court said that if the new
property could fairly be traced back to the old property there is a substantial
exchange; and the court expressly approved the decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals in the Rodenbough case. It is not stated in the Cary case that the
proceeds were deposited in a general account as in the Rodenbough case, but
B. T. A. 477 (1925).
240 STAT. I098 §403 (a) (2)
1I

(I919), U. S. C. (I925) TiT. XXVI § 1o95
(a) (2) (b). The act reads:
'Sec. 403. That for the purpose of the [federal estate] tax the value of
the net estate shall be determined"(a) . . . In the case of a resident by deducting from the value of
the gross estate. . . .
"(2) An amount equal to the value at the time of decedent's death of any
property . . . which can be identified as having been received by the
decedent as a share in the estate of any person who died within five years prior
to the death of the decedent, or (b) transferred to the decedent by gift within
five years prior to his death, where such property can be identified as having
been received by the decedent from such donor by gift, bequest or inheritance,
or which can be identified as having been acquired in exchange for property so
received, if an estate tax under the Revenue Act of 1917 or under this act was
collected from such estate .
.
The Revenue Act of 1926 contains the same provisions. 43 STAT. 43 § 303
(b)(2) (b)(1926).
3
Supra note 2.
'United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. i56 (192r) ; United States v. Davison,
i F. (2d) 465 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1924).
022 F.(2d) 298 (W. D. N. Y., 1927). This construed the same clause of
the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 280 § 403 (4) (b) (2), U. S. CoMeP. STAT.
(Supp. 1925) §6336te. (4) (b) (2).
'See 15 F.(2d) 602 (1926) s.c.
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in the Cary case several sales and subsequent purchases were made. Both
courts agree that the purpose of Congress was to exempt the same estate
from double taxation within five years. With that in mind it is submitted
that the Cary case expresses the proper view, for otherwise a beneficiary of an
estate would have to earmark the proceeds of all property in existence, an inconvenient and cumbersome task, before reinvestment, and it is even doubtful
by the decision in the Rodenbough case if the new property could be kept tax
exempt by this method. If the property were to go out of existence, as in the
Rodenbough case, it would be absolutely taxable, unless the beneficiary kept the
proceeds as he received them, i. e., if cash were paid, to retain the cash and not
reinvest. This might force beneficiaries to retain the proceeds at a low rate
7
of interest, until the five-year period had lapsed, and thus occasion hardship.
Although the burden is on the taxpayer to prove an exemption,' there is a
strong argument that it was Congress' intent" to exempt newly acquired property up to the value of the original property, where it is possible to find as a
fact that the new property is fairly traceable to the old. The two cases present
an interesting problem for a higher court.
TAXATION-INcoME TAx-STATUTE OF LImITATiONs-On June 6, 19r9,
petitioner filed an income tax return for 1918, giving its check for one-fourth
of the amount of the return. Taxes for 1918, plus a five per cent. penalty, were
assessed against it on September 30, 1921, but no suit was ever begun for the
collection of the taxes then assessed. On June 16, 1924, the five-year bar of
the Revenme Act of 192i' became effective, and petitioner appealed against a
threatened collection under a distraint warrant. Held (two members dissenting), that by the Revenue Act of x924,' six years from the date of assessment
is allowed for collection. Art Metal Works v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, B. T. A., Docket No. 16226 (Dec. 6, 1927).
On a question of wide interest the Board of Tax Appeals3 has reversed
the position it adopted in the case of Reliance Manufacturing Co., and it is now
"Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S.41, 77 (1oo), "We are, therefore, bound
to give heed to the rule, that where a particular construction of a statute will
occasion great inconvenience or produce inequality and injustice, that view is to
be avoided if another and more reasonable interpretation is present in the statute." See also Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 37 (1894);
De Bary v. Souer, ioi Fed. 425 (C. C. A. 5th, i9oo).
'Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 146 (1895); U. S. v.
Rindskopf, 1o5 U. S. 418 (1881); Erie R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492
(U. S. 1874); Schuster v. Nichols, 2o F.(2d) 179 (D. C. D. Mass. 1927).
See the report of the Ways and Means Committee, accompanying the
Revenue Act of zgr8, 65th Cong. 2d session, Report 267. In introducing the
Act in the House, Mr. Kitchen said, "We have another very just provision that,
if a person who receives a share of an estate dies within five years of the death
of the person from whom he receives the estate, his share shall not pay another
transfer tax within the five-year period."
142 STAT. 265 (r921), U. S. ComP. STAT. (Sum'.

'43 STAT. 300 (1924), U. S. C. (925)
37 B. T. A. 583, decided June 28, 1927.

i923) § 63361tt.

TiT. XXVI,

§

1o61.
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squarely in conflict with the three courts ' which it there cited with approval.
In the principal case the board adopted the reasoning of the court in In re McClure6 which is a more recent construction of the law involved. The Revee
Acts of r924 " and Y926' have provided that where collection of a tax was not
barred on June 2, 1924, when the z924 Act was enacted, the tax may be collected at any time within six years after assessment made within the prescribed
time. The earlier decisions' have held that this period is not allowed where
the tax was assessed before June 2, 1924, even though collection was not barred
on that date, because of the provision that the Act "shall not affect any assessment made . . . before the enactment of this Act."" The board, in the
Words of the McClure case, decided that as to a prior valid assessment "it shall
not be affected by the (924 Act), that is to say, it shall be no better and no
worse as an assessment," but "it is not enacted that the (924 Act) shall not
That such construction was intended by Congress is evidenced by
apply.""
the insertion of the parenthesis "(whether before or after the enactment of this
Act)" in the corresponding section of the 1926 Act.' The board further points
out that it is familiar law that statutes of limitation relate only to the remedy, not
to the right, and may be altered by the legislature before the statutory bar has
2
become complete.! The fact that this decision will apply to additional taxes
assessed prior to the 1924 Act for the years 1917 to 1923 inclusive, makes the
holding important.
TENANCY By ENTIRETY-DIsPosITIoN OF REAL PROPERTY IN DIVORcE PROcEEDING--An Oregon statute' provided that when a marriage was declared dis-

solved in a divorce proceeding, the party at whose prayer the decree was
granted should be entitled to an undivided third of the real property owned by
the other party in fee at the time of the decree. Plaintiff and defendant were
tenants by the entirety of certain real property, and plaintiff was granted a
divorce from her husband. In the disposition of the real property the lower
court decided that, as the parties became tenants in common by operation of law
when the divorce decree was issued, plaintiff was entitled to an undivided half
"Wilhelm Co. v. Heiner, 21 F.(2d) 463 (W. D. Pa. 1927); United States v.
Whyel, i9 F. (2d) 26o (W. D. Pa. i927); United States v. Cabot, (Sup. Ct.
Dist. Col., decided June 15, 1926).
521 F.(2d) 538 (N. D. Ga. 1927). See also United States v. Benjamin
Russell (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); United States v. Crook, i8 F.(2d) 449 (C. C. A.
5th, 1927) ; United States v. Board, 14 F. (2d) 459, 461 (W. D. Ky. 1926).
'Supra note 2.
'44

STAT. 59 (1926).

'Supra note 4.
'43 STAT. 300 (1924), U. S. C. (1925) Trr. XXVI, § i062.
" Text writers are evidently of the same opinion. MONTGOMERY, INCOME
TAX PRocEDuRE (1925) 321; KIx MI.LER & BAAR, U. S. TAx GuID (1926)
292; HOLMES, FEDERAL TAXES (6th ed. 1925) 1347, note 85.
'Supra note 7.
"Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat 213, 349 (U. S. 1827) ; i WOOD, LIMITATIONS ( 4 th ed. i916) 45 et seq. See also Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. .S. 620
(1885) as to the extent to which the law-making body may alter a statute of
limitations.
'ORE. LAWS (Olsen, 1920) § 5n.
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of the property formerly held by the entirety. In addition the statute was invoked, and plaintiff was awarded one-third of the one-half of the property held
by the defendant as tenant in common upon the rendering of the divorce decree.
On appeal, Held (one judge dissenting), that plaintiff is not entitled to the
additional one-sixth of the property, as the statute is not applicable to real estate
held by the parties as tenants by the entirety. Schafer v. Schafer, 26o Pac. 2o6
(Ore. 1927).

A tenancy by the entirety is an anomalous estate, which in theory is a joint
tenancy modified by the common law doctrine that the husband and wife are one
legal entity 2 Each spouse was deemed to have been seised of the entirety per
tout et non per my, while joint tenants were seised per my et per tout Thus
as each party was seised of the entirety through his spouse, on the death of one
of the tenants the survivor took all, not by right of inheritance, but because the
survivor had been seised of the entire estate since the beginning.' It follows
that from the very nature of such an estate it was incapable of being partitioned.' For this reason a legal fiction was adopted in most jurisdictions, which
terminated a tenancy by the entirety and created a tenancy in common at the
moment a divorce decree was rendered, because, as the marital status was dissolved, there were two living people in whom the title vested, each being entitled
to an undivided half.' Thus in the principal case the plaintiff was awarded onehalf of the property, but the court decided that the statute was not applicable
for the purpose of awarding the plaintiff an additional one-third of her husband's half of the property. Their conclusion was based on a strict interpretation of the phrase of. the statute ".

.

.

should be entitled to one-third of the

real property in fee owned by the other party at the time of the decree." The
court was of the opinion that, as the words "in fee" meant an estate in inheritance,' and as a tenancy by the entirety could not be an estate in inheritance
because the survivor takes all," the defendant did not own, at the time of the
decree, any real property in fee on which the statute could operate. The dissenting judge thought that, as the statute could not be effective until after the
marital status was dissolved,' and as the marital status was not dissolved until
the parties were created tenants in common by the rendering of the divorce
decree, the statute should be applied to the half of the property thereupon held
'Ades v. Caplin, 132 Md. 66, 1O3 At. 94 (1918); Pray v. Stebbins, 141
Mass. 219, 4 N. E. 824 (1886) ; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1903) § I65.
32
BL. Comm. 182.
'Palmer v. Mansfield, 222 Mass. 263, 11o N. E. 283 (1915).
:2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (6th ed. 1921) § 568.
'State v. Ellison, 290 Mo. 28, 233 S. W. lO65 (1921) ; Hayes v. Horton, 46
Ore. 597, 81 Pac. 386 (19o5); Stetz v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 63, 28 N. E. 510
(1891) ; 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (New ed. 1891) § 1651.
Contra: Roulston v. Hall, 66 Ark. 305, 50 S. W. 690 (1899); Alles v. Lyon, 216
Pa. 6o4, 66 Atl. 81 (19o7).

'Thompson v. Thompson, 79 Ore. 513, 155 Pac. ii9o (1916) ; Patterson v.

Ellis's Executors, II Wend. 259, 277 (N. Y. 1833) ; 2 BouvlR LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's 1914 ed.) 1199; 3 WORDS AND PaRASES (1904) 2705.

SRoulston v. Hall, supra note 6; Palmer v. Mansfield, supra note 4.
Houston v. Timmerman, 17 Ore. 499, 21 Pac. 1037 (1889).
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by the defendant as tenant in common in fee. The dissenting opinion appears
to be an attempt to carry out the intent of the legislature, because doubtless the
statute was designed to penalize the party at fault in a divorce suit. By equal
disribution the purpose of the statute is disregarded. Nevertheless it must be
admitted that the decision of the case is based on logical reasoning, and is a
correct technical construction of the letter of the statute, if not the spirit of it.
WILLS-CONSTRUCION OF A BEQUEST OF A "BusINEss"-A testator left to
the plaintiff his "mercantile business, including stock of merchandise, notes, accounts, and fixtures." The estate was solvent. Defendant executors, before
turning over the property of the business to the plaintiff, deducted the amount of
debts owed on account of the business by the testator at the time of his death.
The plaintiff claimed that these debts should have been paid out of the residuary estate under a statute providing that "unless otherwise directed, the debts
of a testator shall be paid out of the residuum." 1 Held, (two judges dissenting)
that the plaintiff recover the amount deducted to pay debts. Bank of Statesboro v. Simmons, 139 S. E. 66i (Ga. 1927).

A man may will either (i)his interest in a business,2 (2) his "business," or
(3) specific physical property belonging to the business.' When there is nothing
else in the will to aid the court in determining what the testator intended to
pass, ordinary construction of language would seem to require that when an interest in a business is bequeathed, the legatee should receive the net proceeds.
Likewise, when the physical property of a business is devised or bequeathed,
that property should pass without credits or the deduction of any liabilities.' But
when a "business" itself is bequeathed, two constructions are possible: either (i)
that nothing but good will' and the physical property necessary' for carrying
on the business is meant to pass, on the theory that the credits and liabilities are
personal to the testator, and so remain with his estate; or (2) that the busi-

'GA.

ANN. CODE (1926)

§3912.

'itre Barfield, 84 L. T. N. S. 28 (i9oi) ; Robertson v. Junkin, infra note
8; In re Teller, 75 Misc. 592, 136 N. Y. Supp. 457 (1912).
See infra note 4.
"In Re Lowe, 2o6 N. Y. 671, 9 N. E. 722 (I912), a bequest of "my printing office and bindery" was held to pass credits to and impose liabilities of the
business upon the legatee. This modified the decision in 149 App. Div. 347,
134 N. Y. Supp. 537 (1912) (holding that the credits were passed without
the liabilities), which reversed the decision in 73 Misc. 178, 132 N. Y. Supp. 478

(191I) (holding that credits did not pass). It is submitted that the lower court
decision was sounder than those of the higher courts in that it noted a distinction between a gift of a business and one of physical property.
'Bradbury v. Wells, 138 Iowa 673, 115 N. W. 88o (i9o8); see note I6
L. R. A.

(N. s.) 240 (908).
6 Interpretations vary as

to what is necessary to carry on the business.
Thus in Blaine v. Chambers, i Serg. & R. (Pa. 1814), a devise of a grist mill
"with appurtenances" was held to pass a dam, race, and portion of ground in
front of the mill for loading of wagons, etc. But in Blake v. Shaw, 8 Week
Rep. 410 (Eng. i86o), and Spark's Appeal, 89 Pa. 148 (I87), bequests in
equally broad language were held not to pass finished stock of manufacturing
businesses on hand at the testator's death.
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ness is a sort of entity' separate from the testator, or at least a separate
"account" of the testator which he bequeaths as such, with the result that the
legatee should receive the credits and assume the obligations, provided the latter are not greater than the assets.8 To be consistent it would seem that the
cases adopting the latter view should pass the credits to the legatee only when
the latter also assumes the liabilities. Prima facie, this appears unworkable
when, as in the instant case, the will provides expressly that notes and bank accounts of the business should pass, and on the other hand a statute provides that "debts of a testator shall be paid out of the residuum."' But if the
second-named concept of the meaning of "business" is adopted, and the business
debts are considered as not those of the testator individually, it is at least arguable, and was apparently the opinion of the dissenting judges in the instant
case, that the debts were not those "of the testator" within the meaning of the
statute. Under this theory the legatee could properly receive the credits and
assume the liabilities. The decisions in the types of cases here discussed, however, are far from harmonious. This is largely due to different conceptions,
naturally varying with each case, as to what intention is to be inferred from
other parts of the will; and to a failure to distinguish between a bequest of an
interest, or of a "business," or of mere physical property.

WITNESSEs-LarTERs

ROGATORY-PowER

OF WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

BOARD TO TAKE TESTIMONY IN A FOREIGN CouNTRY-In proceedings before a

Workmen's Compensation Board application was made for letters rogatory to
take the testimony of the plaintiffs who lived in Portugal. The Board issued
the following request: "It is ordered and adjudged that the American consulgeneral at Lisbon, Portugal, is hereby authorized and requested to take the responses of the witnesses to the interrogatories." This request was complied
with and the responses of the witnesses taken, and returned to the Board. After
a hearing, an award was made to the plaintiff. Held, that the award is set
aside, as the Board has no power to issue letters rogatory. Carvalho v. Cass
Putnam Hotel Co., 215 N. W. 21 (Mich. 1927).
Letters rogatory are issued by the court of one country to the court or
judge of another country in order that the evidence of witnesses in the country
addressed may be taken.1 There is always -an offer on the part of the court
from whence they issued to render a mutual service to the court to which they
may be directed.? A court honoring letters rogatory from another jurisdiction
'In Succession of Sauvage, 14o La. 61g, 73 So. 702. (1916), counsel for
the legatee urged that their client took a store "as a going concern
as though it were a corporation;" and he should "have all of its assets, and out
of these assets pay and discharge all of the liabilities of the store at the date
of his acquisition."
'Robertson
v. Junkin, 26 Can. S. C. 192 (1897).
9
Supra note I.

Union Square Bank v. Reichmann, 9 App. Div. 596, 41 N. Y. Supp. 602
(1896).
2 See I

GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE,

§ 320 (16th ed. 1899).
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can punish a witness who refuses to testify to the interrogatoriesO Since all
these elements of judicial authority necessarily attach to the issue and receipt
of letters rogatory, it seems clear that a Workmen's Compensation Board, not
being a court, could not issue them without statutory authority. However, it
might be questioned whether letters rogatory were issued in the principal case.
Instead, there seems to have been a request to the American consul to act as a
commissioner to take depositions,4 without the aid of any court in Portugal.
The difference is fundamental. A commission follows the procedure of the
court which created it, whereas the court to which letters rogatory are addressed necessarily uses its own procedure in taking the responses of the
witnesses
Generally, Workmen's Compensation Boards have been allowed to
take depositions abroad by commission, but the cases are few in number
In
Pennsylvania the Workmen's Compensation Act is clear that the evidence of a
party or witness outside the state may be taken in such manner as the board
may prescribe.?
'Ex parte Taylor, no Tex. 331, 220 S. W. 7o (192o), annotated in 9 A. L.
R. 963 and (19l2)
6 Coax. L. Q. 196.
'American consuls are authorized and r.equired to take depositions whenever requested by any persons in the United States. 34 STAT. 101 (1906), U.
S. C. (1925) TiT. XXII, § 98.
'Anon. 59 N. Y. 313 (1874); Kuehling v. Leberman, 9 Phila. 16o (Pa.
1875), and supra note i.
'Lobuzek v. American Car and Foundry Co., 194 Mich. 533, i6I N. W.
139 (1917) (which seems also to approve the issue of letters rogatory by the
Workmen's Compensation Board); Jessop v. Maclay and McIntyre, 5 B. W.
C. C. 139 (Eng. 1911). But see Sutton v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 2 K. B. D.
791 (19o9). These English cases consider the county court judges sitting
on Workmen's Compensation Boards as lay arbitrators. In Canada they are
considered as acting in their. judicial capacity, and the Boards may take depositions abroad. Bodner v. West Canadian Collieries, 5 ALTA. L. R. 163 (I912);
Tripodi v. West Canadian Collieries, 7 ALTA. L. R. 167 (1914).
'Act of 1919, P. L. 642 § 6, PA. STAT. (West, i92o) § 22045.

